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Evolution, Idealism, and Individualism in May Kendall’s Comic Verse 
 
May Kendall’s “Lay of the Trilobite” stages a dialogue between the poem’s human speaker 
and a reanimated fossil. In the course of demolishing the human’s self-satisfied belief in the 
evolutionary superiority of his “mighty mind,” the trilobite pokes fun at his reading habits: 
 
 “You’ve Kant to make your brains go round, 
     Hegel you have to clear them, 
 You’ve Mr. Browning to confound, 
     And Mr. Punch to cheer them!”1 
 
The “Lay of the Trilobite” is Kendall’s most frequently discussed poem, and readings of it 
typically focus on its critique of the human’s complacently anthropocentric interpretation of 
Darwinian evolution.2 My argument in this article, however, is that the tendency to focus on 
Darwinism in isolation has obscured the breadth of Kendall’s interests, and, specifically, that 
the passing reference to Kant and Hegel in this poem is an example of her sustained 
consideration of one of the most prominent intellectual trends in late-Victorian Britain: the 
revival of idealist philosophy. I propose to show that Kendall’s comic verse encapsulates and 
interrogates the connections between several important aspects of late-Victorian culture. Her 
thinking about idealism informs and is informed by her views on Darwinism, and both in turn 
constitute parts of the ethical foundation of her belief in social reform.  
 Hegel is absent from the text of “The Lay of the Trilobite” printed in Punch magazine 
in January 1885: “‘You’ve KANT to make your brains go round, / And CARPENTER to clear 
them.’”3 It is easy to see, in this version of the poem, a straightforward opposition between 
the dizzying abstractions of Kant’s philosophy and the scientific exactitude of the work of 
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physiological psychologist William Benjamin Carpenter: as an alternative to the abstruse 
speculations of German idealism, Carpenter’s psychology helps to clear readers’ brains 
through its argument for an empirically verifiable connection between mind and brain. 
Kendall’s decision to revise the poem in her volume Dreams to Sell (published in late 1887) 
was probably motivated, in part, by Carpenter’s death in November 1885. But I want to 
suggest that it was also informed by the prevailing Hegelianism of British idealist 
philosophy; in April 1887 Kendall registered as a student at the home of British idealism, the 
University of Oxford. If she had just been looking for a name to replace Carpenter’s, she 
could have used that of any number of contemporary psychologists or physiologists. Hegel’s 
name radically alters the terms of the trilobite’s satire, and it also disrupts the otherwise 
regular meter of Kendall’s stanza. There is a deliberate purpose behind this revision to the 
poem: it implies that Hegel, in an entirely different way from Carpenter, provides a corrective 
to Kant, and the origins of this claim can be traced to the arguments of the British idealists. 
 Kendall’s education has not yet been examined in detail by critics, but a consideration 
of her Oxford studies can assist in the development of a more nuanced understanding of her 
work, and particularly of her writing about evolution and idealism.4 She was the daughter of a 
Wesleyan minister who was stationed to a new town or city every three years.5 In the 1880s, 
when she was in her 20s, the family resided in Liverpool; she attended lectures at Liverpool 
University College and published poems in The Liverpool University College Magazine. 
When she registered as a student at Somerville Hall, Oxford, one of her referees was A. C. 
Bradley, who taught literature and history at Liverpool. Kendall’s entry in the Somerville 
register states that during her studies, which ended in June 1889, she “attended Professor 
Wallace’s lectures on moral philosophy.” She also explored a range of subjects in tutorials: 
arithmetic in 1887; Shakespeare and Middle English in 1889; and, in 1888, ethics with David 
George Ritchie. Kendall was in receipt of a “scholarship of £100 a year collected for her” by 
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“friends at Liverpool who wished her not to work for exams” towards a particular certificate 
or diploma.6 This financial support enabled her to pursue an independent course of studies, 
and her decision to work with Ritchie, and to attend the lectures of William Wallace, 
demonstrates that philosophy was one of her primary interests. 
Wallace and Ritchie were two of the most vocal proponents of the idealism that 
emerged as the predominant philosophy in Oxford and in Britain more widely during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Like Bradley, they had been taught by T. H. Green, the 
leading figure in British idealism, at Balliol College in the 1860s and 70s. Somerville Hall, 
one of the first two educational institutions for women established within the University of 
Oxford, had close links to idealism from its foundation in 1879. Pauline Adams notes in her 
history of Somerville that Bradley lectured on English literature to the hall’s students before 
he moved to Liverpool in 1881, and that Green’s philosophy exerted a “pervasive moral 
influence on Somerville’s development.”7 As Daniel Brown has shown, Green developed his 
idealism partly in an effort to counter the atheist and positivist views that had become more 
acceptable in Britain as a result of the growing authority of the natural sciences.8 However, 
British idealism was not unequivocally hostile to science itself; both Wallace and Ritchie 
argued for the possibility and utility of an intellectual synthesis with science, especially 
Darwinism. This aspect of idealist philosophy was of particular interest to Kendall, and her 
responses to idealism in her comic verse are comparable to her assessments of evolution: she 
celebrates what she sees as the emphasis in both on progressive change, but she is also 
critical of the way in which this progressivism can sanction dogmatic assumptions about the 
teleological inevitability of particular trends and beliefs. 
The reports on Kendall’s work written by her Oxford tutors are, for the most part, 
succinct: her work on Shakespeare is “first class;” in Middle English she is “good. Takes 
trouble and interest;” and she “would probably pass” an examination in arithmetic, although 
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there is “greater neatness and clearness of statement wanted, and some practice in decimals.” 
Ritchie’s report on Kendall’s tutorials in ethics is a little more detailed, and it highlights their 
discussion of an issue that is central both to British idealism and to Kendall’s writing: 
“Would be a mistake to give up time to preparing for an examination. Much originality. 
Especially striking on ‘asceticism’ and ‘the good and evil of individualism.’”9  The question 
of individualism separated British idealists into two camps: the “absolute idealists” such as 
Ritchie and Wallace who, as Sandra den Otter puts it, “maintained that the relativity of 
experience concealed an underlying universal reality,” and the “personal idealists” who 
“regarded absolute idealism as too other-worldly” and who instead based their ontology on 
the individual mind.10 For Ritchie especially, the philosophy of absolute idealism entailed a 
rejection of individualism, a collectivist view of ethics, and, in politics, a commitment to 
socialism. Hegel and Kant were often identified as the respective guiding lights of absolute 
and personal idealism, and at the turn of the century British writers started to use the phrase 
“Kantian individualism” to refer to the latter.11 “The good and evil of individualism” is a 
subject examined from both sides throughout Kendall’s poetry, and one way of interpreting 
the reference to Kant and Hegel in the “Lay of the Trilobite” is to identify the human as a 
Kantian individualist, whose self-absorbed anthropocentrism might be corrected through a 
recognition of the absolute perspective championed by Hegel and his British adherents. 
As I will go on to demonstrate, the group of poems titled “Science” in Dreams to Sell 
represents Kendall’s most sustained examination of the relations between individualism, 
idealism, and evolution. However, the volume was published more than a decade before the 
first recorded use of the phrase “Kantian individualism,” and this chronological mismatch is 
suggestive of a wider problem in research on Kendall: the scarcity of biographical 
information about her means that it is difficult to ascertain the history and extent of her 
knowledge of idealist philosophy and evolutionary theory. The problem is exemplified in the 
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fact that, whereas Dreams to Sell was published in 1887, Kendall did not study ethics with 
Ritchie until 1888. There is no evidence to indicate exactly when or how Kendall started her 
education in philosophy and science, but it is certain that her Oxford studies constituted an 
extension, rather than the foundation, of her knowledge of idealism. Dreams to Sell therefore 
offers support for LeeAnne Richardson’s suggestion that, because women’s poetry in the late 
nineteenth century frequently addresses issues which are distinct from the concerns of much 
Victorian writing, scholars of this poetry should “look forward—without embracing a 
teleological view—as well as backward.” This approach “alerts us to some of the ways late-
century women poets were vitally involved in poetic innovation, in producing new themes 
and topics, in political changes.”12 Despite Richardson’s disclaimer, there is an element of 
teleology in her suggested method, and this is another reason for its relevance to the study of 
Kendall’s writing. In asking whether and how Kendall’s poetry prefigures later debates about 
the politics and ethics of British idealism, critics can be guided by the negotiation between 
advocacy and skepticism that characterizes her assessment of progressivist teleology. 
Kendall’s work as a whole presents three contrasting interpretations of idealism. Her 
satirical novel “That Very Mab,” which she co-wrote in 1885 with the anthropologist and 
folklorist Andrew Lang, is relentless in its attacks on abstract speculation, on abstruse jargon, 
and on personal idealism’s tendency towards solipsism. Her prose essays of the 1890s, 
written after she had finished her studies at Oxford, endorse absolute idealism’s rejection of 
individualism and align it with the Christian faith in which she was raised. These essays 
indicate that her work with Ritchie and Wallace enhanced her sympathy for the philosophy. 
The comic verse of Dreams to Sell, in contrast, offers a more measured view. At times, 
Kendall’s “Science” poems join the writings of the idealists in imagining an inexorable 
advance from individualism to social solidarity. But they are also dubious of the teleological 
model of history on which this belief is founded, and they voice a concern about absolute 
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idealism’s disregard for individual differences. This skeptical and liberal position is not found 
elsewhere in Kendall’s writing, and it suggests that she saw the standard devices of comic 
verse—metrical regularity, self-aware rhymes, and irony—as uniquely suited to the 
interrogation of the synthetic progressivism that characterized British idealist philosophy. 
Ritchie’s 1893 book Darwin and Hegel exemplifies the idealist position that 
Darwinian evolution was (in the words of David Boucher) “completely compatible with 
idealism because idealism was itself an evolutionary philosophy.”13 Ritchie comments in his 
preface that his aim is “to reconcile a qualified acceptance of the general principles of that 
idealist philosophy which is based on Kantian criticism (but which, at the same time, carries 
us back to Plato and Aristotle) with a full recognition of the revolutionary change in our 
intellectual universe which is due to the historical method of studying ideas and institutions, 
and, in particular, to the influence of the biological theory of natural selection.”14 Although 
Ritchie here identifies Kant, Aristotle, and Plato as the sources of British idealism, in his 
book’s title essay it is the Hegelian dialectic which constitutes the foundational connection 
between idealism and Darwinism. Both “the history of philosophy” and the history of 
“human evolution” more generally, Ritchie argues, are characterized by a “‘dialectic 
movement’” in which “progress does not go in a straight line; but, just because thought enters 
into the process, at each step there is an attempt to correct the one-sidedness of the preceding 
stage.”15 Ritchie presents biological, social, and philosophical history as analogous 
manifestations of a universal process of evolution that has shaped “ideas and institutions” as 
well as organisms. His integration of Darwinism with idealism enacts the way in which the 
“one-sidedness” of any stage of this process is corrected by the emergence of its antithesis. 
 The idealists’ correction of Darwinism primarily consists in their claim that “the true 
nature of a thing is to be found not in its origin but in its end.”16 Ritchie’s work in particular 
illustrates Devin Griffiths’ recent argument that natural selection can be interpreted as “a soft 
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teleology,” because, although Darwinians such as Thomas Henry Huxley classified 
evolutionary variations as “the fruit of chance events,” Darwin’s theory “in fact required 
thinking about purpose: in order to imagine the natural history of a given adaptation, one had 
to guess what that adaptation does, and then explain how that purpose might have developed 
through gradual changes in specific behaviors or structures.”17 Reversing Darwin’s rhetorical 
focus on origins, Ritchie argues that evolution is a teleological process because the survival 
or otherwise of variant forms¾biological, social, or intellectual¾depends on whether or not 
they are useful; therefore, he contends, “the explanation of structures, habits, etc., must be 
found in the end or purpose that they serve.” But he insists that what he terms the 
“conception of Final Causes, which the theory of Natural Selection restores, is not the cruder 
form of teleology which attempts to explain everything in the universe by showing that it 
serves the good of man.” Evolution does not tend towards the good of “individuals,” or of 
“the species of human beings,” but of the universe as a whole.18 This position shares its 
emphasis on the partial perspective of human thought with Kendall’s satire of 
anthropocentric evolutionism in the “Lay of the Trilobite.” 
 Ritchie’s combination of skepticism and epistemological ambition, highlighting the 
limitations of human knowledge while simultaneously championing the universal scope of 
idealism, is also evident in the work of Kendall’s other Oxford teacher, William Wallace. In 
the “Prolegomena” to his 1874 translation of the essay on logic in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences, Wallace asserts that “it is reason,¾the Idea,¾or, to give it an 
inadequate and abstract name, Natural Selection¾which has created the several forms of the 
animal and vegetable world: it is reason, again, which in the struggle for existence contradicts 
the very inadequacies which it has brought into being: and it is reason, finally, which affirms 
both these actions,¾the hereditary descent, and the adaptation¾in the provisionally 
permanent and adequate forms which result from the struggle.”19 The process of natural 
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selection, Wallace suggests, is provisional and unending, a view of evolution that again 
supports Kendall’s critique of anthropocentrism. And the process is directed by a reciprocal 
exchange between the contradictory dynamics of “hereditary descent” and “adaptation.” 
Edmund Neill traces the same argument in Ritchie’s work, observing that Ritchie “aimed to 
harmonise Hegelian and Darwinian procedures by arguing that natural selection could be 
used to explain” Hegelian teleology “by setting the processes of inheritance and spontaneous 
variation in a dialectical relationship.”20 
For Wallace, human knowledge of the universal “Idea” that underpins this 
evolutionary dialectic is also provisional: “the Absolute¾this term, which is to some so 
offensive and to others so precious¾always presents itself to us as a Relative.” Wallace tries 
here to pre-empt criticisms of idealism’s totalizing invocation of an abstract “Absolute” by 
conceding the inherent relativism of philosophical knowledge. In the same sentence, though, 
he claims that it is possible to transcend this relativism and to progress to a recognition of the 
universal: “when we have, so to speak, seen the Absolute Relativity of Relation, there is very 
little more needed in order to apprehend the Absolute pure and entire.”21 
 One of those who found the jargon of idealism “offensive” was Andrew Lang, who 
studied at Balliol College at the same time as Wallace. Lang was not a convert to T. H. 
Green’s idealism. Green’s popularity with students, Lang wrote in 1905, was founded on his 
  
knack of translating St. John and Aristotle alike into a terminology which we then 
believed to be Hegelian. Hegel we knew, not in the original German, but in lectures 
and in translations. Reasoning from these inadequate premises, it seemed to me that 
Hegel had invented evolution before Mr. Darwin, that his system showed, so to speak, 
the spirit at work in evolution, the something within the wheels. But this was only a 
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personal impression made on a mind which knew Darwin, and physical speculations 
in general, merely in the vague popular way. 
 
Lang “never believed that ‘the Absolute,’ as the Oxford Spectator said, had really been ‘got 
into a corner.’ The Absolute has too often been apparently cornered, too often has escaped 
from that situation.”22 Kendall collaborated with Lang throughout the 1880s and 90s; their 
1885 novel “That Very Mab” uses the Shakespearean fairy Queen Mab as the vehicle of a 
sustained attack on the intellectual pretensions of Victorian culture. Much of the book’s 
comedy is aimed at scientific positivism and utilitarianism, but it also lampoons idealist 
theories that claim to align themselves with the natural sciences. The owl who acts as Mab’s 
guide on her return to Victorian Britain tells her that “now the philosophers are borrowing an 
eye of Faith from the theologians, and adding it on to their own microscope like another lens, 
and they have detected a kind of Absolute, a sort of a Something, the Higher Pantheism. I 
could never tell you all about it.”23 The owl’s vague description of “a kind of Absolute, a sort 
of a Something” is an effective pastiche of the prose style of writers such as Wallace (“the 
Absolute Relativity of Relation”). His baffled attempt at a summary satirizes the British 
idealists’ analogical linking of natural and spiritual processes, and it suggests that idealism’s 
position as a middle ground between science and theology is intellectually untenable.  
 Lang’s criticisms of the idealists’ synthesis of scientific and philosophical knowledge 
were founded on direct contact with the theories of British idealism, and it seems likely that 
Kendall’s early knowledge of the philosophy was informed, in part, by her collaboration with 
him. Their satire in “That Very Mab” is comprehensive: as well mocking the jargon of the 
absolute idealists, it also targets personal idealism. At the end of the novel, Queen Mab 
abandons Victorian Britain in despair, and the owl, with nothing better to do, starts “a course 
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of psychological research that, it is to be feared, if persisted in, will seriously injure his 
brain:” 
 
For he said, only yesterday, that as he was conscious of external objects merely 
through the medium of his own ego, how was he to know whether or not his own ego 
was the sole ego in the universe¾in fact, composed the universe? He wished to be 
informed whether he could possibly be nothing but an impression or [sic] somebody 
else’s ego; and said finally, in a despondent tone, that it was hopeless to regard this 
mundane scheme as anything but a subjective phenomenon, mere Schein or maya, and 
that he gave it up.24 
 
These sentences voice a concern that idealism’s prioritizing of thought at the expense of 
“external objects” might promote a solipsistic belief that the individual mind “composed the 
universe.” And this ontological and ethical criticism is connected to a historical argument. 
Building on Lang’s interest in comparative anthropology, the novel posits an equivalence 
between the Sanskrit word “maya,” used in Hinduism and Buddhism to denote (as the Oxford 
English Dictionary puts it) “the illusion or appearance of the phenomenal world,” and the 
term “Schein,” which is employed by Kant and Hegel to refer to phenomenal objects, and 
which Wallace translates as “mere show or seeming.”25 Supritha Rajan has argued that 
Lang’s anthropological writings highlight “the uneven segregation of magic from modern 
scientific rationalism and capitalist self-interest,” thereby critiquing rationalism and 
utilitarianism as versions of magical thinking.26 In “That Very Mab” Lang and Kendall put 
forward a similar claim about Victorian idealism, which, they imply, is not an advance in the 
dialectical progress of knowledge, but a reiteration of a flawed subjectivist theory that has 
surfaced in more than one historical and cultural context. 
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 This is not, however, a legitimate characterization of the absolute idealism of Ritchie 
and Wallace, both of whom insist that the essential unity of existence discredits individualism 
in metaphysics, ethics, and politics. For Wallace, “the only source from which moral actions 
can flow, as effects from cause, is a sense of solidarity with humanity, a perception that we 
are not our own individual selves, but that we share in an ampler life.”27 And progress, 
according to Ritchie in his 1889 Darwinism and Politics, involves a recognition that personal 
and social development are inseparable. He asserts that the Hegelian dialectic “is the way we 
have to think about everything,” and then asks: “and if we apply this dialectic method to 
society, what does it suggest? That we cannot rest in the critical or negative stage of modern 
individualism.” This model of progress “implies an advance to a stage in which all that is 
most precious in individualism must be retained along with the stability of social condition 
which individualism has destroyed. And this new stage can be best described by the word 
‘Socialism.’”28 This argument indicates that Ritchie agrees with Kendall, who, in their 
tutorials together the year before, saw both “good” and “evil” in individualist ethics. But 
elsewhere in Darwinism and Politics he quotes Kendall’s poetry in support of an unequivocal 
attack on individualism, and on those who claim that Darwinian theory legitimizes laissez-
faire models of sociology and economics: 
 
  “We dined, as a rule, on each other. 
  What matter? the toughest survived.” 
This is a sufficient morality in the mesozoic epoch for the ichthyosaurus, to whom the 
sentiment is ascribed by the poet; and it is a convenient morality for some human 
animals in London to-day. Admirable, doubtless¾this scheme of salvation for the 
elect by the damnation of the vast majority.29 
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Kendall’s “Ballad of the Ichthyosaurus” epitomizes the pervasive irony of her “Science” 
poems, as its speaker deplores its underdeveloped brain in terms that celebrate human 
intellect while at the same time mocking teleological interpretations of evolution: “A loftier 
goal is before us, / For higher endowments we sigh.”30 Ritchie, though, disregards the poem’s 
irony and takes the dinosaur’s words seriously, using them to illustrate his argument that the 
competitive struggle of natural selection is not in itself a sufficient explanation of the 
processes of social evolution. In his 1893 preface to Darwin and Hegel, he claims instead that 
his “Idealist Evolutionism” represents “the best starting point for an examination of the 
concrete problems of ethics and politics,” because it identifies biological evolution as a 
subordinate element in the universal process that also directs the development of ethical and 
social beliefs.31 
 The critique of individualism that Ritchie puts forward in his essay on Darwin and 
Hegel is aimed primarily at Herbert Spencer, whose progressivist model of evolution and 
emphasis on the competitive “survival of the fittest” were arguably more influential than 
Darwin’s work in shaping Victorian understandings of biological and social evolution.32 
Ritchie rejects Spencer’s view that “the movement of human progress is all in one direction.” 
“Any attempts to get rid of some of the anarchy of individualism he can only interpret as a 
return to militancy. A follower of Hegel would agree with the average man that it is no such 
thing.” In using socialist policies to mitigate the excesses of individualism, Ritchie insists, 
society will not be regressing or degenerating but “advancing to a new stage which shall 
reconcile both elements.”33 But his preference for one pole of this dialectic ahead of the other 
is evident throughout this essay: 
 
the abstract individual¾the favourite idolon of popular philosophy¾is destroyed by 
the logic of Idealism, whether in the region of Metaphysics or of Ethics. Of course 
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each of us, if we had been making the universe, might have made his own individual 
self the centre of it; but logic teaches us that we cannot think the universe rightly from 
our individual point of view, and life teaches us that we must not live it from our 
individual point of view.34 
 
For Ritchie, the metaphysics of absolute idealism offers a reliable map to the “region” of 
social ethics. Just as the process of biological evolution is directed by a universal idea of 
dialectical progress, the development of the individual is inseparable from a social idea of 
solidarity with others. Both in theory and in practice, the limited perspective of the 
“individual point of view” is nugatory unless it is incorporated within a collectivist 
understanding of society and of the universe. Progress, therefore, is dependent on the 
destruction of the “abstract individual” of Spencer’s “popular philosophy.” 
 In the decade or so after she finished her studies at Oxford, Kendall published a series 
of short essays in Methodist periodicals which champion the idealist claim that evolution 
moves inexorably away from individualism and towards solidarity. It seems that her work 
with Ritchie prompted her to examine how absolute idealism might be compatible with the 
ethics and beliefs of Christianity, and the Christian-idealist position that she develops in these 
essays intervenes in some of the most prominent intellectual debates in late-Victorian Britain: 
it is at the same time an epistemological critique of scientific materialism; an ethical response 
to Darwinism; a defence of spirituality; and a blueprint for social reform, which Kendall 
developed further in the social research to which she devoted much of her time in the years 
after 1900.35 In “The Social Ideal,” printed in The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine in 1894, 
Kendall joins Ritchie in attacking Spencer’s confidence in laissez-faire individualism as the 
basis of social ethics, but she does so in terms that highlight the similarities between 
Spencer’s evolutionary progressivism and Ritchie’s teleological idealism: “Somewhere Mr. 
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Spencer seems to think that one day the biddings of egoism and altruism will coincide,” she 
writes, “but that day, at all events, is too far remote to need consideration.” The essay 
questions the idealist conviction that the dialectical progress of history leads inexorably to the 
synthesis of opposing tendencies, and it also refutes Ritchie’s political optimism, as Kendall 
insists that “from no earthly republic or democracy can we expect universal happiness.”36 
The best guide to moral progress, she suggests here, is not idealism but Christian faith. 
For the most part, though, Kendall’s prose writings are sympathetic to idealism, 
presenting the philosophy as supportive of, rather than opposed to, Christianity. The rebuttal 
of individualism that Kendall sets out in “The Fear of Death” (1895) commences with a 
discussion of scientific materialism, in which she dismisses any understanding of “the world 
as a system of atoms separable from mind altogether.” “It would be less misleading,” she 
avers, “to say that molecules were an arrangement of the soul¾a form of consciousness, if 
we like that better.”37 Although Kendall rejects materialism, her argument here is not a 
conventional statement of Christian dualism. Instead she claims, in agreement with Wallace 
and Ritchie, that the material and the ideal are reconcilable facets of an underlying unity. 
This universal monism undermines the notion of a discrete self: Kendall asserts that 
“the soul is not, as we are all too apt to assume at times, a thing shut up in a box by itself and 
labelled with the name of its owner.” “Rather, a man’s soul,” she suggests, is “so much of the 
thought and will of the universe as somehow both is the man and is in his keeping, for good 
or evil, for which he can never shake off the sense of responsibility¾a converging and 
diverging point of influences, where these are altered for better or worse.” Although she 
emphasizes the reality of personal responsibility, she concludes that the moral orientation of 
this responsibility is collective rather than individual: “we must save our souls, not because 
they are ours, but because they are nothing of the kind.”38 In his analysis of her essays, John 
Holmes notes that “Kendall’s ethical position is grounded in her own Christianity, but it does 
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not require any specific theology, or even any theology at all, to sustain it.”39 This is because 
Kendall’s position is both Christian and idealist. Modified by the ethics of idealism, 
Christianity is presented in “The Fear of Death” as a moral rather than a theological system, 
in which the individual soul is defined by the influences of, and its influence on, the souls of 
other people. 
 “A Plea for Asceticism,” published in The London Quarterly Review in 1900, 
addresses a subject which Kendall had discussed in her tutorials with Ritchie: “Asceticism is 
not suicide, though ill balanced asceticism may look a good deal like it. And yet it involves a 
death, the death of the particular, as opposed to the universal self, whose will is one with the 
divine will.”40 The self-sacrifice of personal desires in an attempt to approach the divine will 
is the basic premise of Christian asceticism, but Kendall’s reference to “the universal self” 
connects it to the British idealists’ critique of individualism and their belief in the essential 
unity of existence. Like Wallace and Ritchie, Kendall in this essay identifies moral progress 
and biological evolution as analogous forms of development: “It is the lesson of evolution 
itself¾this constant surrender of the lower to the higher type. Progress means 
differentiation,¾self-denial. The crimson petals of the rose, botanists tell us, are simply 
leaves thwarted, baulked of their old development, crushed into this strange splendour. Think 
of a human being instead of a plant, and you have the argument for asceticism.”41 In an 
ethical argument that is simultaneously evolutionary, idealist, and Christian, Kendall claims 
that, in the same way as the thwarted development of leaves results in the emergence of the 
more complex and beautiful structure of the rose, the “self-denial” of asceticism enables a 
“surrender of the lower to the higher type,” a step in the soul’s progress towards the goals of 
social solidarity and the universal self. 
 The poems on science in Dreams to Sell simultaneously promote and interrogate this 
kind of evolutionary teleology. They put forward teleological arguments, but they also use 
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the formal and linguistic resources of comic verse to stage a skeptical examination of those 
arguments which is subtler than the broad mockery of “That Very Mab,” and which is in 
striking contrast to the earnest moralism of Kendall’s essays. The poems’ scientific reference-
points are not restricted to evolution: “A Pure Hypothesis” builds on late-Victorian 
discussions of four-dimensional geometry. The poem is subtitled “A Lover, in Four-
dimensional space, describes a Dream,” an “awful dream / Of Three-dimensioned Space:” 
 
 I would not, if I could, recall 
     The horror of those novel heavens, 
 Where Present, Past, and Future all 
     Appeared at sixes and at sevens, 
 Where Capital and Labour fought, 
     And, in the nightmare of the mind, 
 No contradictories were thought 
     As truthfully combined!42  
 
In contrast to our three-dimensional world, the speaker implies, four-dimensional reality is 
organized through a version of the Hegelian dialectic, in which “contradictories” such as 
“Capital and Labour” are “truthfully combined” in the teleological unfolding of time. The 
stanza illustrates the interpretative problems involved in reading Kendall’s comic verse. The 
speaker is horrified by their three-dimensional nightmare, and it is possible to argue that the 
poem asks its readers to acknowledge the social problems that elicit this horror, to welcome 
the possibility of a kind of progress that will resolve Victorian Britain’s class conflicts, and, 
as Wolfgang Funk puts it, to recognize “that the ability to imagine higher dimensional space 
represents a measure of evolutionary progress.”43 But the speaker’s heightened language and 
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the stanza’s formal regularity result in a tone of exaggeration which in turn invites an ironic 
and skeptical reading, and it is also possible to interpret the poem as a satire on those 
Victorian writers who used four-dimensional geometry to speculate about higher forms of 
consciousness and social organization. 
Rhyme is of particular importance to Kendall’s poetic assessments of teleology, and 
Gillian Beer’s work on the satirical capacities of rhyme helps to explain this link. Beer notes 
in her essay on “Rhyming as Comedy” that “rhyme is always retrospective.” The completion 
of rhyme depends on a comparison between the sound of a line of verse and the sound of a 
preceding line or lines; in a way that is structurally similar to the British idealists’ 
evolutionary dialectic, it can be understood as an expression of the relation between the start 
and the finish of a series, between an origin and an end. But Beer also points out that the 
comedy of rhyme is founded on a “kinship” between words that is “illegitimate according to 
the rationale of semantics:” the development of a rhyme scheme is not logical or progressive, 
and “rhyme-words couple but resist collapsing into each other.”44 The perfect rhyme of 
“fought” and “thought” in “A Pure Hypothesis” embodies the ideal resolution of social 
disputes that the speaker describes, but it also highlights, in its juxtaposition of the two 
words, the distinction between social arrangements and philosophical theories which 
Ritchie’s political idealism tries to collapse. Through rhyme, Kendall’s comic verse both 
enacts and resists the dialectical synthesis of idealist teleology. 
The poems in Dreams to Sell also utilize a duality which is identifiable in meter. 
Devin Griffiths has made a persuasive case for understanding meter in evolutionary terms, 
defining it as “an evolving system, an environment of rhythmic noise that offers fertile 
ground for seeded patterns of reorganization and rhythmic departure.”45 In other words, it 
unfolds through a process of punctuated equilibrium, in which the recapitulation of patterns 
and structures is interrupted by variations which transform those structures. This dialectical 
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exchange between uniformity and adaptation suggests that meter might be an apt vehicle for 
articulating the evolutionary teleology of the British idealists, but Kendall’s satirical poems 
are characterized by a metrical regularity that typically eschews obvious and purposive 
variation. In this they are representative of “the overwhelming majority of Victorian comic 
verse,” which, as James Williams notes, “is written with a prominent metrical beat” that 
“makes us hear metre as something at odds with feeling, an anarchic energy working against 
sincerity and seriousness.”46 The meter of Kendall’s poetry, in this reading, is not imitative of 
its speakers’ arguments; instead it constitutes an alternative system of implication, 
contrasting with and countering those arguments. The tension between these two 
interpretations of meter can be seen especially in polysyllabic words such as 
“contradictories” in “A Pure Hypothesis.” In the rhythms of speech this word contains just a 
single stressed syllable, and when read in this way it represents a disruption to the poem’s 
regular meter, expressive of the conflict it describes. But when read in a way that maintains 
the poem’s regular beat, the sound of the word becomes distorted, and this distortion, 
enforced by the relentlessness of the meter, emphasizes and satirizes the inexorable march of 
progress imagined within the poem. 
This sort of teleological progress is linked directly to evolution in “Woman’s Future,” 
the final poem in the “Science” section of Dreams to Sell. Dismissing the prejudice that 
women’s “intellects” are “bound by a limit decisive,” the poem’s speaker retorts: 
 
 We heed not the falsehood, the base innuendo, 
     The laws of the universe, these are our friends. 
 Our talents shall rise in a mighty crescendo, 
     We trust Evolution to make us amends!47 
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The consecutive stresses of “we heed not,” upsetting the poem’s iambic and anapaestic meter, 
are exactly the sort of generative variation that might give poetic voice to the social reforms 
posited in Ritchie’s idealist evolutionism. As Marion Thain has pointed out, evolutionary 
theory was an important rhetorical prop for fin-de-siècle women poets who argued for the 
inevitability of gender equality.48 The progressivism of Kendall’s poem is reiterated in its 
final lines, as its speaker assures women readers that, in the future, “the knowledge of 
Newton will beam from your faces, / The soul of a Spencer will shine in your eyes.”49 The 
poem illustrates, to some extent, LeeAnne Richardson’s contention that “representations of 
progress in late-century women’s poetry are very often gendered and very often clothed in 
the language of science. Science in these poems is allied with experiments with prosody as 
well as imagining new forms specifically adapted to new political realities.”50 But, however 
radical its political position, “Woman’s Future” is not an experiment in poetic form. On the 
contrary, it is shaped by the use of an established formal device—polysyllabic, unstressed 
rhyme—that is conventionally indicative of comedy. Kendall’s comic poems follow the 
example of the Victorian dramatic monologue in maintaining an ironic distance between 
speaker and poet, and it is likely that the obtrusive rhyme of “innuendo” and “crescendo” is 
designed, in part, to mock the argument which it expresses. And, considering Kendall’s 
criticisms of evolutionary progressivism elsewhere, it is hard not to hear some bathos in the 
poem’s clinching identification of Herbert Spencer as the end-point of women’s evolution. 
 Kendall consistently uses her comic verse to interrogate the facile optimism which 
assumes that human beliefs and institutions are expressions of the universe’s teleological 
evolution. “Woman’s Future” shows that she was prepared to poke fun at examples of social 
progress in which she was personally invested, such as women’s education. She reserves her 
most direct satire, however, for cases in which notions of progress are used to legitimize 
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political injustice. In lines which immediately follow the discussion of Kant and Hegel in the 
“Lay of the Trilobite,” the fossil says to the human: 
 
“The native of an alien land 
    You call a man and brother, 
And greet with hymn-book in one hand 
    And pistol in the other!’”51 
 
Ritchie argues in Darwinism and Politics that idealism’s collectivist view of ethics justifies 
“thoroughgoing” state intervention to address social inequality, and that “even a partial State-
action may be gladly accepted, as a recognition that the State has duties towards its weaker 
members.”52 But in critiquing imperialism and racism, issues that Ritchie neglects to discuss, 
this stanza highlights the way in which evolutionary teleology (in conjunction with religious 
hypocrisy and Victorian exceptionalism) can help to legitimize a kind of “state-action” that 
depends on violence and subjugation. 
 The most sustained commentary on the social and political aspects of idealism in 
Dreams to Sell is set out in “Nirvana,” a poem which does not directly consider any scientific 
theories, but which earns its place in the group of poems on “Science” through its critique of 
a teleological perspective that is analogous to (and, for Kendall and the British idealists, 
closely connected with) evolutionary progressivism. The poem employs a comparative stance 
similar to that of “That Very Mab,” aligning the idealist “Absolute” with “nirvana,” a term 
which, as the Oxford English Dictionary notes, refers in Buddhism to “the realization of the 
non-existence of self, leading to cessation of all entanglement and attachment in life.” 
  
 Some hold, life’s transitory pain 
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     Arises from our being fractions: 
 When we to Unity attain, 
     Behold the end of fret and factions! 
 
 They say each individual soul 
     Will in a general Soul be blended, 
 And that the universal whole 
     Is certain to be something splendid.53 
 
In its linking of idealist philosophy with Asian religion, the poem presages twentieth-century 
orientalist descriptions of absolute idealism: in 1903, for example, The Daily News opined 
that “Hegel’s philosophy, like that of all great religions, is of the East; a reaction from the 
Kantian individualism,” an “Eastern subordination of the Self to the All.”54 In the writings of 
Wallace and Ritchie, and in Kendall’s essays, the surrender of individualism is seen as an 
elevation rather than a subordination. “Nirvana,” however, holds this teleological view at 
arm’s length, both through its attribution of the argument to others (“they say”), and through 
the repetitive pattern of its metrical beat, which checks the supposedly inexorable progress 
traced in the second stanza by imposing a rhythmic uniformity on the antagonistic phrases 
“individual soul” and “universal whole.” The poem’s satire also works at the levels of 
typography and rhyme. Its use of capitalization, particularly in the transition from the 
“individual soul” to the “general Soul,” parodies the hypostasized abstractions that abound in 
idealist philosophy, and its unstressed rhymes undercut its invocation of a “Unity” that is 
described, with vacuous incongruity, as “splendid.” 
 As an example of “fret and factions,” the poem’s next stanzas cite a dispute, about 
whether it was possible to reconcile the narrative of the creation in Genesis with the evidence 
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of the fossil record, which took place between William Gladstone and Thomas Henry Huxley 
in the pages of The Nineteenth Century in late 1885 and early 1886: 
 
 Then enmity will pale and pall: 
     We shall be brothers, more than brothers; 
 For if we are ourselves at all 
     We shall be also all the others— 
 
 One fancies Huxley might display 
     A faint concern, as wondering whether 
 He’d time to have a parting fray 
     With Gladstone, ere they rushed together—55 
 
Huxley’s rushing together with Gladstone here literalizes and therefore parodies the idealist 
conviction that antagonistic perspectives can and will be merged in a dialectical synthesis. 
And Kendall’s repetitions of words manage at the same time to represent this synthesis and to 
ridicule its totalizing abstraction. The word “all,” used both in its adjectival sense to denote 
an entirety and in the conditional phrase “if at all,”, opposes and countermands itself; and the 
repetition of “brothers” echoes the “Lay of the Trilobite,” as Kendall again questions the 
teleological assumption that humans are inevitably progressing towards equality. 
 In “Nirvana,” as in the theories of the British idealists, this equality is presented both 
in ontological and in political terms. The “universal whole” is described as 
 
 A sea of light, a gulf of bliss, 
     An end of individualism, 
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 The Universal Suffrage this, 
     The blessed goal of Communism!56 
 
It is possible that Kendall’s satire is directed here not at idealism itself but at her speaker’s 
limited knowledge of the philosophy: the conflation of two distinct political goals, 
communism and universal suffrage, perhaps reveals an imprecise grasp of the issues in 
question. On the other hand, the stanza may also constitute a gloss on a duality present within 
Ritchie’s political arguments, which are both socialist and democratic in orientation. Ritchie 
advocates an expansion of the suffrage among men and women, because the vote “is a stamp 
of full citizenship, of dignity and of responsibility. It is a distinct mark that the possessors of 
it can no longer be systematically ignored by governments and can no longer shirk the duty 
of thinking about public and common interests.”57 In other writings Kendall joins Ritchie in 
celebrating the advance towards the “end of individualism,” but in “Nirvana” she playfully 
deploys rhyme, and specifically rhyme’s tension between acoustic unity and semantic 
division, to subvert the Hegelian dialectic on which the theories of British idealism and of 
communism depend. To some extent the rhyming of opposed “isms” encapsulates and enacts 
the progress from one to the other, but the easy congruence of sound in rhyme—which here is 
limited to the shared suffix—also emphasizes, through contrast, the ideological opposition 
expressed in the bases of the two words, thereby questioning the possibility of such progress.  
 Gillian Beer observes that “Kendall has a shrewd eye for all forms of aggrandizement, 
particularly those of the self,” and that she uses “the element of artful self-congratulation in 
achieving rhyme” to satirize (in the “Lay of the Trilobite,” for example) the boastfulness of 
intellectual theorizing.58 Kendall’s rhymes in “Nirvana,” however, imply that the selflessness 
of collectivism can also be a sort of self-aggrandizement, because it threatens to absorb and 
 24 
silence opposing perspectives. The poem suggests that there may be more humility in 
individualism, and it ends with a plea to delay the inexorable advance of unity: 
 
 We love our feuds, our party views, 
     Our idle heresy and schism: 
 The time may come, we cannot choose 
     ’Twixt M. Comte and Methodism. 
 
 Let us be human, while we can 
     Enjoy this strange terrestrial tangle: 
 Nation with nation, man with man, 
     While yet we may, oh let us wrangle!59 
 
The rhythms of Kendall’s verse in the final stanza are unusually irregular: the trochaic 
inversions (“let us,” the two uses of the word “nation”) constitute variations which resist, 
rather than enact, the evolutionary dialectic of absolute idealism. In contrast to Kendall’s 
Christian-idealist essays, “Nirvana” prioritizes the good ahead of the evil of individualism, 
offering a liberal defence of the diversity and relativity of personal opinion. Beer argues that 
the incomplete synthesis of words in rhyme means that “its accords are a form of 
disputation,” and that therefore “rhyme lends itself to two apparently contradictory 
movements of mind: scepticism and faith.”60 The rhymes in “Nirvana” express a faith in 
disputation. The poem’s celebration of controversy and debate, exemplified in the 
penultimate stanza in the rhyme of “schism” and “Methodism” and in the disparity between 
Kendall’s Methodist faith and the positivism of Auguste Comte, questions the totalizing 
synthesis of intellectual and social differences on which idealist teleology is based. 
 25 
 The formal conventionality of Kendall’s comic verse potentially has the effect of 
masking the sophistication of its interests. But it is that conventionality—specifically, the 
poetry’s use of regular patterns of meter and rhyme to exaggerate, ironize, and subvert the 
arguments conveyed in its language—which enables Kendall’s innovative discussion of 
questions about the relations between idealism, socialism, and individualism that emerged 
with greater prominence in Britain in the 1890s and 1900s. Kendall’s poems prefigure these 
questions, because both are responses to the ideology of synthetic progressivism which was 
influential throughout British culture in the late-nineteenth century. James Paradis has 
suggested that Victorian satire operates through “a potent imagery of incongruent forms that 
juxtaposes the symbols of one worldview with those of another while making no commitment 
to reconciling these diverse materials. Indeed, the energies of irony and satire as a literary 
form are derived from their failure to resolve.”61 This assessment is particularly relevant to 
the end of the nineteenth century, because it indicates how satirical analysis could be used to 
counter the attempted synthesis of contrasting worldviews which underpinned much late-
Victorian thinking, and which was exemplified, for Kendall, in the teleological Darwinism of 
the British idealists. 
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